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Abstract 
This paper uses the records of the Beaumont-Blackett lead mining concerns in Allendale to 
examine the earnings for lead miners in this part of the Northern Pennines for the late 1850’s 
and early 1860’s. The paper matches two parts of the historical record, the Bargain books and 
Beaumont-Blackett’s quarterly financial accounts to give a more complete picture of the 
earnings of this group of workers than has previously been achieved. The paper shows that 
the distribution of earnings for lead miners has a distinct structure in comparison to coal 
miners and suggests some motivations for lead miners working decisions. One conclusion 
that may be drawn is that they were, in essence, prospectors. 
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I Introduction 
Lead mining was an important industry in the Northern Pennines all through the 18th 
century and for most of the 19th century2. Numerous aspects of the way the industry was 
organised are of interest to the economic historian. This paper mainly focuses on one of 
these, namely the form of the contract between the miners and the mine owners and asks 
whether more can’t be deduced from existing historical records to give a clearer picture of 
individual worker’s earnings than has so far been achieved, and also whether improved data 
on earnings can be used to examine other aspects of the contract setting observed at the time. 
Lead had been mined in the Northern Pennines since Roman times but started to grow 
in the latter part of the 17th century and into the 18th century as the pace of economic activity 
started to pick up. The two largest commercial concerns involved in the lead mining activities 
in this area during this time were the London Lead Company and the Beaumont-Blacketts’ 
Figure 1 Map of Alston Moor and Allendale  
                                                          
2 Burt (1984) analyses the industry in different parts of the country, in Wales, Derbyshire, and Northumberland, 
Honeyman (1982) also looks at aspects lead mining in Derbyshire, while Hunt (1970) and Raistrick and 
Jennings (1965) concentrate more on the Northern Pennines 
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Source Thomas Sopwith “An Account of the Mining Districts of Alston Moor, Weardale and Teesdale” 
The London Lead Company concentrated most of its activity in the Alston Moor area 
to the west while the Beaumont-Blacketts’ were more in evidence in Allendale, Weardale and 
Northumberland to the east. This study uses records from the second of these concerns and 
focuses on the mines at the head of the east Allen river at Allenheads, Coalcleugh, (both 
marked on this map) and  also Swinhope and Killhope. 
 
II Bingtale, Fathomtale and other Contracts 
The main form of lead mining contract in the Northern Pennines was termed a 
“bingtale” contract. This was essentially a piece rate contract. Groups of miners, often 4 or 6, 
would make a bargain with the mine owners to dig in a particular part of the mine, for a 
quarter. The contract would specify a particular price to be paid to the miners for each bing of 
ore raised and dressed. The ore was Galena (lead sulphite) which contains around 80% lead. 
A bing was 8 cwt (hundredweight), or 0.4 of a ton. Dressing was the process by which waste 
material would be separated from ore so that the ore would be ready for smelting. The miners 
would be responsible themselves for paying for this to be done.  
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 There were other types of contracts used in the work in the mines, fathomtale 
contracts were bargains made for digging a fathom (6 feet), for instance in driving a level, 
that is a passageway in the mine in which the gang might encounter ore, but where the purpose 
was to gain access to sources of ore and to make drainage for the mine, the contract would 
quote a particular rate per distance. Sometimes the bargains would be types of hybrid 
contracts which would give a separate rate for distance and for ore raised.  
 Some authors suggest that there was some movement from bingtale to fathomtale over 
the evolution of the industry3, and this was due to the objective of trying to make workers 
earnings less variable. This issue of the variability of earnings and also due to the fact that the 
contracts were settled intermittently seems to have been behind the practice of making 
advances to workers. In the mid to late 19th century the Beaumont-Blackett company would 
advance 40s (£2) to each worker each month, but this would need to be paid back when the 
bargains were settled4. If the group of workers had had an unsuccessful bargain and not found 
sufficient ore, then potentially they could end up in debt to the mine owners. 
  The piece rate nature of both Bingtale and Fathomtale contracts, are likely to do with 
the monitoring problem for underground working, especially as the payment for many of the 
more easily observable tasks were made on wage contracts, or Daytale work in the parlance 
of the time and place.  
 Occasionally workers in the Northern Pennines would contract to be paid on the 
amount of lead actually smelted, these types of contracts were called Tontale contracts, but as 
far as the author is aware these contracts were only used for recovering lead from the residue 
produced by the washing process. Here the percentage of lead would be more variable, 
whereas the percentage of lead in Galena ore was essentially fixed. It is this fact which most 
likely explains the different way of contracting.  
  
III The Historical Records Pertaining to these Contracts 
                                                          
3 Hunt (1970) and Raistrick and Jennings (1965) give some discussion of this 
4 Hunt (1970) 
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Bingtale contracts would be recorded in Bargain (or sometimes letting or setting) 
books, and looked like:- 
Figure 2: A Bargain from the Allenheads mine in 1861 (Northumberland Record Office 
Document NRO/672/E/2A/10) Reproduced with permission of Viscount Allendale  
        
 
This record was made on March the 30th 1861 and shows that Robson Whaley and 3 
other miners, Joseph Bell, John Seaton and William Armstrong contracting to drive a 
“forehead” west in “four fathoms limestone” in Old Vein5 in Allenheads Lead mine at 168/- 
per fathom until the 30th of June. The contract also specifies that they will be paid 44/- per 
bing of ore raised. It also specifies the days and hours they would work. Specification of 
hours and days only came latter on the in the 19th century, mainly at the instigation of 
Thomas Sopwith who was the chief agent of the Beaumont concerns between 1845 and 
1871.6  
The number of miners in each gang was very often an even number, this is likely to 
do with the technology of the mining the harder rock at this time, to blast rock away a long 
metal chisel called a “jumper” would be driven into the rock, one member of the gang 
holding it and rotating it, to avoid sticking, in between strikes at the other end by the other 
member of the gang with a hammer. Odd numbers in a gang are not unknown it is likely that 
these miners would concern themselves with softer deposits. Half partners are also 
occasionally seen and this is where miners would take their sons, or younger family members 
down the mine.  Although Robson Whatley was the first named member of this gang of 
                                                          
5 Old vein was among the oldest veins worked at Allenheads mine, see Fairbairn R A (2000) 
6 Sopwith (1833) 
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workers and his name appears in the financial accounts as being in receipt of the gang’s 
earnings, for distribution note that John Seaton signs the bargain. This give added support to 
the assumption, which is made throughout the study, is that these 4 men are equal partners in 
the venture and that the proceeds from such would be equally split.  
 
IV Earnings of Miners 
Much of the discussion of earnings in the literature suggest that it is very difficult to 
form an accurate picture of the earnings of individual workers.  
 “The accounts of the Blackett/Beaumont mines give only some indication of the 
miners’ general prosperity; there are no specific figures for annual earnings. The surviving 
accounts are the general accounts of the costs and production at each mine. No wage books 
or their equivalents survive. Thus it is recorded that ‘_____ and partners’ raised so much ore 
at such and such a price during a quarter, but that the partnership’s expenses – washing, 
drawing, candles, etc. – are not recorded, and the same partnership may appear elsewhere in 
the accounts for specific dead work or days’ labour performed. It is thus hopeless to attempt 
to work out from these figures the actual year’s earnings of an individual partnership.” 7 
 
 One of the primary purposes of this paper is to argue that this might be too pessimistic 
an outlook and that we might well be able to form some view of not just partnership’s 
earnings but the earnings of individual miners themselves by matching the original bargain to 
records of subsequent payments made on the bargain. To start the discussion for this assertion 
Figure 3 gives a segment of the Beaumont/Blackett accounts for the June quarter of 1861 
recording specifically payments made for ore raised for Old Vein in the Allenheads mine 
under the contract in Figure 2. As Hunt observed above there is clear information on the 
physical amount of ore raised, the rate of pay and the amount paid out. So Robson Whaley 
and his gang received £24/15s for the 11 bings 2 cwt of ore which he and his partnership 
raised. 
                                                          
7 Hunt (1970) p 73 
 7 
Figure 3a Segment of the Beaumont/Blackett accounts for the June quarter of 1861 
(NRO/672/E/3A/5) Showing Bingtale payments to Robson Whaley as detailed in the contract 
in Figure 2  Reproduced with permission of Viscount Allendale 
 
Note that Christopher Philipson appears twice in these accounts. This is not because 
his gang had two bargains but rather he is being paid for output from the first quarter of this 
year. Bingtale work was only paid every 6 months, and the first and second quarter bargain 
will appear in the accounts as two separate items only when the price of the bargain changed, 
as it did here for Philipson’s gang from 30/- to 40/-. The other amounts are the joint amounts 
for the two quarters, so for example the bargain rate for Whaley’s gang was 44/- in both 
quarters, and they raised 11 bings 2 cwts over the two quarters8.   
In the same accounts the amount paid for the fathomtale part of Whaley’s gang’s 
contract can be found 
Figure 3b Fathomtale earnings made to Robson Whaley in the second quarter of 1861 
(NRO/672/E/3A/5) Reproduced with permission of Viscount Allendale 
 
                                                          
8 Note also that in the extreme left hand margin there is a number. This column is not labelled, which is unusual 
as the record keeping of these mine clerks is often exemplary. By tracking back to the original bargain for which 
this is the payment this is shown to be the number in the gang. If doesn’t appear to be universal practice to note 
this information in the margin and appears just to be an idiosyncrasy of this clerk. In earlier bargain books this 
doesn’t seem to be common   
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For the Beaumont Blackett concerns this matching, while routine in the main, is 
feasible and enables the researcher to deduce some aspects of the pay of these workers9.     
As has been mentioned the groups of miners were responsible for a variety of other 
costs of extraction, the main cost would have been dressing the ore, but also candles, blasting 
powder, drawing of the ore from within the mine to the dressing floor, which would usually 
be immediately adjacent to mine entrance. Information on these other costs are relatively rare 
but Bernard Jennings’ 1959 MA thesis from Leeds10 contains a table, reported in Appendix 1 
records the monetary costs of deductions from miners’ pay for the first 5 months of working 
Friarfold vein off St Francis level in A. D. Company’s mine in Swaledale in 187811, on the 
assumption that the quantity of candles used, and the cost of tools will be a function of the 
number in the gang, the costs of drawing and washing will be a function of the number of 
bings of ore raised and the cost of dynamite will be a function of the number of miners in the 
gang and the amount of ore raised, regressions are computed to predict the deductions for 
miners in Allendale. These deductions are then taken out of the gross amount received by the 
miners gang to give a net amount. These regressions are also reported in Appendix 1 
The data is organised by gang and quarter. The histogram below gives the distribution 
of monthly average earnings ( the average being computed within the gang) of 234 miners 
who worked in 66 gangs in Allendale between 1858-61. Occasionally we will see a gang only 
working 2 or 3 quarters in the year, but we observe 249 quarters of data over the period.  As 
mentioned the numbers of miners in the gangs were almost always an even number of the 66 
gangs 18 have 2 members, 46 have 4, 1 has 6 and 1 has 8. The histogram gives some other 
interesting indications; while the mean earnings (£3/10/-) is roughly comparable with 
previous work. It does seem, however, that a small number of gangs are achieving reasonably 
high earnings for the period. This right skewness in the data is of some importance to our 
story. 
Figure 4 Net pay per month of Allendale Lead Miners in 1858-61 
                                                          
9 This process of matching can be made significantly more difficult if a company give up a lease, see Barmby 
(2013). 
10 This thesis has been digitised and is available at the Brotherton Library 
http://digital.library.leeds.ac.uk/1844/ 
11 Although the period which the deductions are observed is later than the earnings period for Allendale, this 
will if anything overstate these costs   
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The numbers in brackets above the bins is the number of quarters in which this mean 
net monthly pay was observed (remember the miners were only paid their bingtale earnings 
each six months, and their fathomtale each quarter). Looking back at Figure 2 we see that 
some contracts had both Bingtale and Fathomtale elements, in fact 45% were composite 
contracts, as in Figure 2, 53% were pure Bingtale contracts but only 2% were pure 
Fathomtale contracts.  
 To get an idea of how these earnings compare to general wage levels at this time a 
craftsman’s daily wage would be around 56d, which would give a monthly earnings of 
£4/13/412, coal miners earnings in the early 1860’s would be around £413. Lead miners were 
therefore not well paid on average, but it does appear that there was significant variability for 
workers over the quarters between 1858 and 1861. To get a more relevant comparison, 
perhaps, the mean fortnightly pay at the Townley Colliery at Ryton, on the south bank of the 
Tyne, 36 miles from Allenheads was just over £2 working full time, and also the standard 
deviation was smaller. So this raises a question; if there was higher, less variable pay just 
down the valley why go down a lead mine ? There might be other compensations; lead 
mining presented less immediate risk of injury, as trapped gas would not be present in a lead 
                                                          
12   Phelps-Brown and Hopkins (1981) 
13   Feinstein (1981) 
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mine so there was no risk of explosions. Lead miners would also often have small holdings as 
well which would supply goods to supplement the household budget. However the more 
obvious difference in the structure of earnings is the noticable right skew  of lead miners 
earnings, and while the high variance has often been emphasised as this had a downside, 
insomuch as miners could end up in debt to the mine owners. The high variance coupled with 
the positive skew also had an upside namely that relatively high payments are not so 
insignificantly rare. In this sample 19 out of the 249 quarters (7% of the time) the average 
earnings within the gang were above £6. In Townley Colliery the maximum fortnightly pay 
was £2/16/10 for mining coal; even if that maximum was replicated in a second fornightly 
period it would come to less than £6. It seems therefore that there was a possibility of a 
bigger payoff in the lead mines.  
Table1: Some comparison of earnings between lead and coal miners 
Earnings Allendale Lead Mines Townley Colliery 
Median £3.33 £3.98 
Third Quartile £4.35 £4.28 
Ninth Decile £5.82 £4.70 
95 % point £6.85 £4.88 
 
Table 1 attempts to set out the difference more clearly bu comparing the higher 
percentage points. It can be seen that while the median earnings for lead miners compared to 
coal is around 15% lower the 95% point is 49% higher. Although maybe not as glamorous as 
gold mining lead does have some of the characteristics gold prospecting; although the returns 
are not as certain if you do hit lucky the payoff could be reasonably high.   
 
V Were Bargain Rates Successfully Set to Equalise Mean Earnings ? 
In this section we pay some attention to the setting of bargain rates. In 1861 the 
lowest bargain rate was 15/- and the highest was 70/-, 70/-  seems to be an outlier as the next 
largest was 50/- as can be seen from the histogram below. Also in the histogram below the 4 
pure fathomtale bargains; where the bargainrate was by definition zero are excluded. Here the 
geology of the situation may be important if bargain rates were set relative to the difficulty of 
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the working14. Miners working on a difficult vein might not produce as much weight of ore 
but might end up, on average at least, earning the same. This was not in any way a social 
object of the mine owners15, simply since the bargain rates had to be set such that workers 
would be willing to take up the bargains16. 
     Figure 5 Histogram of Bargain rates in Allendale in 1861 
 
It is interesting to contrast the method of contracting observed in coal mining at the 
same period, where the miners would be randomly allocated a location to dig on the coal 
seam by the method of “cavilling”17 and contracts would be longer. Here it seems very likely 
that since the miners had at least as good information as the mine owners the process of the 
frequent renegotiation of the bargain rate and the freedom of the group of miners to decline to 
take up a bargain was a device designed to extract the potentially better information that the 
miners held18. 
                                                          
14  Hunt (1970) and Raistrick and Jennings (1965) 
15 I acknowledge correspondence with Professor B Jennings regarding this point 
16 Burt and Kippen (2001) discuss rational choice by miners over contracts in the context of Cornish metal 
miners 
17 Daunton M J (1981). 
18 It is intriguing line of thought to reflect how much the miners were using their knowledge of geology 
in making decision over bargains . Thomas Sopwith, who was the main agent of the Beaumont/Blackett 
concerns in the early to mid-part of the 19th century gives suggestive examples; Sopwith (1833) p 120-3 writes 
about a number of experienced miners making substantial fortunes (Utrick Walton and the brothers John and 
Jacob Wilson). In this discussion Sopwith acknowledges the uncertainty inherent in mining but observes “… it 
strikingly appears how much practical judgement and experience may be exercised in reducing that uncertainty 
to a great degree….”  
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In the Northern Pennines, it seems that the mine agents would propose a rate for a 
particular section of the mine. The bargains would very accurately describe the area of work, 
terms such as “between William’s sump to Henry’s rise” 19 will be seen written in the bargain 
indicating a clear internal map of the mine and way of describing locations.  
There is little evidence on the exact workings of these negotiations; around setting 
day you will see most bargains start up on the quarter day, but sometimes bargains will be a 
dated a day or so later. We may deduce that these were bargains whose rates were not set 
high enough to attract takers but that the firm still wanted to proceed with and so revised the 
price so as to attract takers20. 
The idea that the bargain rate would be set to equalise earnings can potentially be 
examined with this data. The following two graphs attempt to do this by examining the 
relationship between earnings and the piece-rate for both bingtale and fathomtale work using 
non-parametric regression (so as not to impose linearity on the relationship). If the rate was 
set so as to equalise earnings then the line would not be differentiable from a horizontal line.  
Figure 6(a)  Earnings from Bingtale vs Rate 
 
                                                          
19 A level was a horizontal corridor driven within a mine, an adit a level which would exit the mine giving 
drainage as well as access. A shaft would come from the surface a sump is essentially a shaft but dug down from 
a level within the mine and a rise digging upwards from level within the mine, likely following a vein of ore.  
20 I am grateful to Ian Forbes for drawing my attention to the following entries in Thomas Sopwith’s diary for 
1845 “Saturday 4th October. At Allenheads where I let the bargains, as is termed for the East Allendale miners. 
This occupies the greater part of the day and was followed by a dinner at the inn at which all the inspectors and 
chief clerks etc were usually present and which I was expected to preside” and then on “Monday 6th October. 
This is called placing day, in the local conversation of Allenheads miners. Some workmen when offered a 
“bargain” or contract to work for three months and if no agreement is come to, they remain “out” or 
unemployed. Occasionally there is not employment for the enture body of miners and those who are not 
required are also “out”. The object of “placing day” is to reconsider the contract prices and to endeavour to 
find occupation for all the workmen resident in the district”  
 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6(b)  Earnings from Fathomtale vs Rate 
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 Taken together the main message of these two figure suggest two things. Firstly, 
taking into account the confidence intervals, over a significant range of rates, both for 
bingtale and fathomtale, some support for the idea that earnings are equalised can be seen. 
This fits in with the idea that miners had some discretion over whether they took bargains, as 
you wouldn’t observe bargains being taken that the miners’ didn’t think worth their while. 
However, in both cases, for higher rates this seems to break down, but interestingly though in 
different ways. For bingtale contracts higher priced bargains seem worse, whereas for 
fathomtale higher priced bargains seem better. 
 One possibility is that workers are trading off, in some way, the expected mean pay 
against the expected variability. If we can take the width of the confidence interval in the 
above diagrams to give some measure of variability then both diagrams make sense in a 
conventional economic way. The workers need to be compensated for higher risk, so for 
bingtale lower priced bargains have both higher variance and higher mean earnings, and 
conversely for higher priced bargains. The same mean variance trade-off could be argued to 
exist for fathomtale except that it is higher priced bargains which have the higher variance. If 
this line of reasoning is followed than the question needs to be posed, if these workers exhibit 
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a degree of risk aversion in trading off mean against variance in their acceptance of bargains 
then why don’t they move the few miles down the road and become coal miners. There they 
would get higher mean pay and lower variance in their pay. This would certainly be 
preferable if they only cared about mean and variance. The assertion here is that they also 
were aware of the (positive) skewness of earnings, which presented them with the not 
insignificant probability of a substantial pay off, in terms of their behaviour they like high 
mean, lower variance, and higher positive skewness. In essence they were prospectors.   
 If miners are contracting over both types of work, as we have seen they often are, it 
would present the opportunity for a sort of self insurance, if they had a high priced bingtale 
then they would also seek a high priced fathomtale contract to compensate. Put another way 
for insurance accepted bingtale and fathomtale rates should be positively correlated. However 
if they are seeking to maximise expected earnings higher fathomtale rates should be 
associated with lower bingtale rates; a negative correlation. Given the variance in the 
earnings distributions we have observed in figure 4 maybe it is this latter situation which we 
should expect, and indeed regressing bingtale rate on fathomtale rate for those contracts in 
which both types of work are contracted for gives a significant negative coefficient. 
Figure 7 Plot of Bargaintale against Fathomtale rates 
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VI Did some workers earn persistently higher wages ? 
Returning now to think about the structure of the histogram in figure 4. The unit of 
observation is the average monthly net earnings of miners within the groups observed. The 
present range of the data is between 1858 and 1861; for some groups we observe their 
earnings continously for each quarter other groups we see less. The author is presently 
building up a database of earnings, by the matching of bargains to subsequent payments as 
has already been desecribed. 
 We can imagine the path of miners as they move through time contibuting to this 
histogram. If the process by which thir earnings are determined is random, some bargains pay 
well, other do not, and there is no way of telling, then they will move about the histogram 
over time, sometimes being in the upper tail sometimes the lower, dependent on whther they 
have have had a lucky draw or an unlucky draw. 
 If on the other hand, the (small amount) of discretion they are given over which 
bargain they take allows them to use some knowledge of geology to make good decisions, 
then you wouldn’t see them jumping about the histogram, you would see some persistence in 
their earnings and some groups would be able to make earnings in the upper part of the 
distribution quarter after quarter.  
 This can be examined by regressing current earnings against earnings in previous 
quarters as  
Netpayt = 0.0348 + 0.3254 Netpayt-1 
                  (5.38) 
 
 
Netpay in the above equation is in terms of deviation from the median, £3.19 (mean is £3.33, 
remember the distribution is skewed. The positive and significant estimated coefficient 
indicates that those earning above the median tend to continue to do so and visa-versa.    
 
VII Some Concluding Thoughts 
The research reported here I think represents, at least in some respects, a new 
approach to the economic history of the Northern Pennine Lead miners. The historical 
records, and the linking of the intial bargains with the subsequent payments is a process 
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sufficiently effective so as to enable the researcher to construct quite detailed information for 
individual miners over time. It is certainly the case that carefully matching of the written 
bargains with the subsequent payments could be done for quite extensive periods of time 
especially in this latter part of the 19th century.  
The present literature is rather ambivalent regarding the variablity of payments under 
Bingtale contracts, ascribing its persistence to the inherent dispositions of workers towards 
risk, and maybe over emphasising the downside when workers ended up in debt to the miner 
owners. It seems at least plausable that a contract which persisted for more than 200 years is 
likely to have offered at least some benefit to both sides. The available data can, I believe, 
support a more thorough examination of performance of the contracts and supplement the 
view already current.  
I have shown that, for around 1861 at least, the variability of the earnings of miners in 
the area around the head of the river Allen valley was quite high, with some evidence of a 
positive skew. The analysis presented supports the assertion that these workers were able to 
balance risks of different kinds, in terms of the mean, variance and skewness of the earnings 
distribution21, and did so skillfully to control the latent probabilities determining their pay 
evidenced by some lead miners certainly making more money than comparable coal miners  
 More research is always possible, the question of how the bargain rate was set, the 
extent to which workers were able to use their skill and knowledge to generate persistently 
higher earnings for themselves, and effectively earn a return on the human capital embodied 
in their understanding of geology, are certainly amongst these, but the results presented here 
represent a new persepective on the work decisions of these group of workers in the 19th 
century. 
                                                          
21 See Ekern (1980) and Chiu and Eeckhoudt (2010) for technical details of how higher degrees of risk can be 
modelled for decision making 
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Appendix 1: Costs of candles, dynamite, drawing, washing and tools for the first five months 
of mining at St Francis Level 1878. data from Table 3 Chapter X, p 280. B Jennings (1959) 
 
 
 
Regressions of other costs on number and bings raised;  N=22, 
Variable (mean - £) Constant Number (‘t’) Bings (‘t’) R2 
Candles (0.98) 0.1198 0.1267 (1.42)  0.09 
Dynamite (3.9) -1.2175 0.2327 (0.74) 0.1743 (2.97) 0.62 
Drawing (2.99) 0.8354  0.1067 (6.28) 0.66 
Washing (2.05) 0.0268  0.0997 (51.66) 0.99 
Tools (0.14) 0.0787 0.0093 (0.47)  0.01 
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Archive Sources 
Primary archive sources used are held in the Beaumont/Blackett papers at the 
Northumberland Record Office at Woodhorn. 
NRO 672/E/2A/10 Bargain Books for Allendale 1858-1865 
NRO 672/E/4/A/1 Quarterly Accounts 1861-1878 WB Lead Mines Allendale 
 
North of England Institute of Mining and Mechanical Engineering 
NEIMME/Wks/67/20/1-Wks61/20/3 Townley Colliery No.6 Pay March 1862 
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